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DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS AND U.S. BANKS:
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION K
SATURNINO E. Lucio, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States banks which hold, as creditors, the external
debt obligations of certain countries, have several choices concern-
ing such debt. The simplest option is for the bank to keep the debt
in its portfolio and await eventual repayment from the debtor.
However, in the case of most sovereign debt due by lesser devel-
oped countries, the banks may have been forced to reschedule the
payment terms of the debt several times during the past five years;
and it is entirely possible that the banks may have to further
reschedule such debt in the future. In general, debt rescheduling
involves an alteration of one or more of the following terms of the
debt: 1) a reduction in the interest payable on the unpaid amounts
of the debt, at rates approximating, with successive reschedulings,
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) of interest, and away
from the higher rate of interest originally agreed to between the
banks and the debtor; 2) an extension of the maturity date of the
repayment of the principal portion of the debt, from the usual
three to five year term of such loans to terms extending up to
twenty-five years; and 3) an extension in the grace period before
commencement of payments on the principal amount of the obliga-
tion. Reschedulings also may involve other troublesome aspects for
banks. For instance, the sovereign debtor may require additional
loans from the creditor banks as part of the rescheduling.
There are several problems with continuing to hold the debt
through successive reschedulings. First, the terms of a rescheduled
debt are invariably worse than when the bank originally extended
credit. Second, there is always the possibility that a sovereign
debtor may be unwilling or unable to pay the debt (in essence, re-
pudiating the debt). Moreover, the sovereign debtor may demand
an additional period of time (i.e., a moratorium), even without the
consent of the creditors, before making any further payment of
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principal or interest. In such situations, creditor banks must
choose between pressuring the debtors for payment or entering
into a new agreement with the debtor country that will likely in-
volve further concessions by the banks. Third, if a U.S. bank holds
troubled sovereign debt, it will find that U.S. bank regulators and
the bank's own auditors will increasingly insist on the bank taking
certain measures to protect itself against a total loss of the debt.
These measures may involve further reporting obligations by the
bank, the creation of special reserves and write-offs of all or a por-
tion of the debt, all of which consume management time and cre-
ate additional costs for the banks.
A second option for the bank is to dispose of the debt. The
bank may either sell the debt instrument to a third party or trade
a particular country's debt for the debt of another country which
the bank prefers to hold or which the bank believes has a greater
ability to pay.
Thus, the bank can sell the debt on the international second-
ary market for foreign debt. Many banks and other institutions
regularly trade foreign debt, usually at a percentage discount of
the face amount of the obligation due. The discount depends on
the market's assessment of many factors, including the external
debt policy of the country, the amount of its international reserves,
its ability to borrow from international organizations (i.e., the
World Bank), and the degree of inflation in the domestic economy.
The discount percentage can vary over time as well as from coun-
try to country. Recently, for example, Peruvian debt was generally
trading at approximately five percent of its "face value" compared
to Chilean debt which investors bought and sold at approximately
sixty percent of its face value.
This secondary market can be quite "thin" with respect to the
debt of certain countries. It also may be speculative and subject to
rapid fluctuation. Many intermediaries may be involved in sourc-
ing and placing the debt being traded, charging substantial com-
missions based on a percentage of the transactions.
The bank selling the debt, however, must properly account for
its sale. A bank that valued a foreign debt on its books at
US$1,000,000 cannot maintain this value when it sells the debt at a
deep discount. For example, on a sale of debt at fifty percent of its
face value, the bank must record the incoming cash of US$500,000
and account for the US$500,000 loss. This situation can become
extreme, as in the case of Peruvian debt, which trades on the sec-
[Vol. 21:2
DEBT-EQUITY SWAPS
ondary market at about five percent of its face value; thus forcing
the bank to account for a loss of ninety-five percent.
These losses require an accounting adjustment which lowers
the total asset value of the bank, and thereby reduces the bank's
overall capital-to-assets ratio. Because U.S. law requires U.S.
banks to maintain a certain capital-to-assets ratio, the losses re-
sulting from a swap may make a bank fall below its required ratio.
In this event, the shareholders of the bank will need to invest addi-
tional amounts of capital in the bank.
The third major option for U.S. banks with respect to such
sovereign debt is to convert such debt into an equity investment in
a foreign country under the applicable debt-equity swap program
that may be in effect in such country. Not all debtor countries
have such debt-equity programs, nor are such programs uniform
among the countries in which they exist. Debt-equity swap pro-
grams are currently in effect in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Venezuela, and the Philippines. Similar programs have been
in existence in Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, and Costa Rica, but these
have either been suspended temporarily or terminated (although
they may be reactivated in the future). Other countries, such as
the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, are in the process of imple-
menting debt-equity swap programs. The basic purpose of these
programs is to convert a large and pressing external debt obliga-
tion of the sovereign debtor, which must be serviced with scarce
hard currency earnings of the country, into a productive medium
to long-term investment in a targeted economic sector of that
country.
II. DEBT-EQUITY SWAP PROGRAMS
Under a typical debt-equity swap program, the debtor govern-
ment arranges for the payment of local currency to the holder of
the debt in return for cancelling such debt. The local currency
must then be invested in certain targeted investments within the
debtor country. These investments are, in most cases, limited to
the acquisition or development of "hard assets," such as land,
buildings and machinery, and perhaps working capital and other
soft costs. The purpose of these programs is to attract foreign in-
vestment to the debtor country.
The face amount of the foreign debt is redenominated in local
currency through a formula consisting of the exchange rate be-
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tween the two currencies, and a "conversion factor." The "conver-
sion factor" that is applied by a foreign government will vary with
market conditions and the type of investment, including the result-
ing contribution to local economic development or the gen-
eration of hard currency earnings for the country. In order to as-
sure such an impact, countries usually impose some restrictions on
the ability of the former holder of the debt to repatriate the pro-
ceeds of the swap investment (i.e., the investor cannot repatriate
the investment for eight years, or only in twenty percent annual
portions).
For a bank holding sovereign debt, a debt-equity swap offers
certain tantalizing opportunities, tempered, of course, by the risks
and costs involved in such an arrangement. First and foremost, the
bank has the opportunity to convert a long-term and possibly
questionable debt repayment into a current productive investment
in a foreign country. For example, a bank holding Brazilian debt,
which has been subject to a payment moratorium, may be able to
convert such debt into an equity interest in a new tourist hotel. If
the hotel can be operated at a profit, particularly by bringing in
joint venture partners with experience in the hotel or tourist in-
dustry, the bank may improve its financial position as a result of
the swap. Second, the bank may eliminate the debt from its troub-
led loan portfolio and cease reporting the converted debt or dis-
continue maintaining any reserves with respect to such debt, thus
freeing up bank personnel and resources for other tasks. Third, the
bank may be able to diversify its traditional banking activities into
other activities not necessarily closely related to banking. Fourth, a
debt-equity swap may be the only method through which a bank
can avoid taking a substantial loss on its books when it trades the
debt it holds. Equity investments are generally valued by banks at
the lower of cost or market, offering various ways in which a bank
could successfully argue to its auditors and regulators that it has
incurred only a minimal loss because of the swap.
III. U.S. BANKING REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
Until recently, the principal authority under which U.S. banks
could engage in a foreign debt-equity swap was found under "Reg-
ulation K" of the Board.' Although a discussion of the intricacies
of Regulation K is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say
1. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.7, 211.21-23, 211.31-.34, 211.41-45, 211.601, 602 (1989).
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that it offers very limited authority for these types of transactions,
particularly for smaller U.S. banks.
As a result of the complexity and limitations of the Regulation
K process, some banks may prefer to follow an alternative route
for making the debt-equity swap. In two no-objection letters issued
in late 1987 and in early 1988, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC") validated this alternative approach,2 which is
based on the principle of "debt previously contracted" ("dpc")
under Title 12, Sections 24 and 29 of the United States Code.3 Be-
cause the OCC is the agency which regulates the activities of na-
tional banks in the United States, these letters are not binding on
the regulators of state chartered banks. Nevertheless, the "dpc"
concept is generally found under various state banking laws as well
as under various laws administered by the Board.
A. Basis for Authority to Conduct "DPC" Acquisitions
A bank's authority to carry out a swap investment under
"dpc" principles derives from two sources: 1) Title 12, Section 29
of the United States Code which permits national banks to hold
real property in satisfaction of debts previously contracted; and 2)
Title 12, Section 24 (Seventh) of the United States Code, which,
along with judicial precedent and analogies to Title 12, Section 29
of the United States Code, authorizes national banks to hold eq-
uity securities in satisfaction of debts previously contracted.5 This
authority is a necessary and implied power of banks recognized
since the earliest days of the United States and included among
the powers granted in the National Currency Act of 1863.6
2. Exchange of Bank's Mexican Sovereign Debt Portfolio for Interest in Privately
Owned Mexican Hotel Pursuant to Mexican Government's Debt/Equity Swap Program,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,039 (Nov. 27, 1987) [herein-
after OCC Letter I]; Debt/Equity Swap Transaction in Chile in Satisfaction of Debts Pre-
viously Contracted, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,047
(May 20, 1988) [hereinafter OCC Letter II].
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29 (1988).
4. For an example of a state law recognizing the "dpc" principle, see Fla. Stat. §
658.67(9) (1984).
5. OCC Letter I, supra note 2.
6. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). See Atherton v. Anderson,
86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (national bank
permitted to operate manufacturing company in order to salvage the bank's unpaid debt);
California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1987) (although national bank may not generally
acquire stock in a corporation, incidental to the power to loan money is the power to secure
loans with stock and to become the owner of the stock in order to salvage the debt).
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B. Special Issues in Debt-Equity Swap Context
Although a "dpc" acquisition is a common banking practice in
the United States, particularly in domestic foreclosure situations,
no attempt was made until 1987 to apply this concept to foreign
debt-equity swaps. Consequently, there existed several open issues,
which have now been settled, regarding the application of "dpc"
principles in this context.
1. "Default" of Debt as Necessary Condition
One open issue was whether there had to be a default under
the "debt" before a bank could exercise its "dpc" authority. The
OCC, however, has recognized that no law or regulation required a
finding that the debt was in default to permit such type of acquisi-
tion.' So long as the bank could show, based on all facts and cir-
cumstances, that its purpose in making the acquisition was not to
speculate but rather to simply effect a maximum salvage of a
troubled debt, "a bank has implied power when faced with a loss
growing out of a legitimate banking transaction to acquire stocks
or other property when it is honestly believed at the time that
under more favorable circumstances a loss which would otherwise
accrue might be averted or diminished."8 A bank has this power
even if no default has occurred, but the bank concludes in good
faith that there has been a negative "change in the financial capac-
ity of the borrower sufficient to invoke the use of DPC authority."9
The advisability of converting a foreign debt into an equity
position in a foreign company, like the issue of whether the bank
should continue to operate a manufacturing company, is not to "be
resolved by the application of arbitrary or empirical tests, and
much must be left to the business judgment of those responsible
for its solution if such judgment is honestly exercised."1 As noted
earlier, there are many sound reasons why U.S. banks may desire
to pursue debt-equity swaps. If the circumstances are right and the
opportunity exists, U.S. banks are permitted to exercise their
sound judgment and convert the debt into an equity investment
under "dpc" principles.
7. OCC Letter I, supra note 2.
8. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d at 525. See also First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Nat'l
Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875).
9. OCC Letter I, supra note 2.
10. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d at 525.
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2. Taking "DPC" Property from a Third Party
Another open issue was whether the property obtained in the
swap had to be the property of the debtor as opposed to property
of a third party. As noted by the OCC, there is no requirement
under "dpc" cases that the property conveyed to a bank to satisfy
debts previously contracted served as collateral security for the
debt or had been the property of the debtor." While this may be
the typical pattern, there are probably many instances in which
U.S. banks have obtained interests in real property and companies,
where third parties conveyed these interests to the banks (whether
or not they were guarantors of the loan) to satisfy unsecured debts.
In contrast, sovereign debt tends to be unsecured. Moreover, it
is not likely that a sovereign debtor would swap the national pal-
ace in lieu of paying its external debt.2 Instead, sovereign debtors
with debt-equity swap regimes have established a system whereby
their foreign debts can be exchanged for currency or other prop-
erty to be invested in their countries. Indeed, the two OCC letters
accept that mechanism as being in compliance with the "dpc"
concept."3
3. Necessity for Debt to Have Originated with a Bank
Finally, OCC Letter II settled the issue of whether the debt to
be exchanged for the swap investment had to be the debt of the
country originally in the bank's portfolio or could be another coun-
try's sovereign debt which the bank acquired by trading.14 In OCC
Letter II, a national bank held Brazilian and Venezuelan debt, but
located a good swap investment opportunity in Chile. The bank
desired to swap the Brazilian and Venezuelan loans for Chilean
debt held by another bank, and then to contemporaneously swap
the acquired Chilean debt for the investment in Chile. Noting that
the bank would not engage in the first part of this transaction (as
to which it had the inherent power to reconfigure its loan portfolio)
without assuming itself it could complete the second step of the
transaction, and viewing all these steps as part of an integrated
11. See supra note 2.
12. There is an increasing tendency among debtor countries, e.g., Argentina, to offer to
exchange state-owned companies for foreign debt. This "privatization" approach is becom-
ing an important route for debt-equity swaps in Latin America.
13. See supra note 2.
14. OCC Letter II, supra note 2.
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operation, the OCC did not object to the bank's "dpc" acquisition
of the shares of a Chilean insurance company.
C. Holding Periods for "DPC" Acquisitions
"DPC" acquisitions differ from typical investments in that
they are generally regarded as temporary and permitted only for a
limited period of time within which the bank must make reasona-
ble efforts to dispose of the "dpc" property. Holding periods for
"dpc" property are generally limited to five years by statute i" and
by judicial and OCC precedent, although Title 12, Section 29 of
the United States Code permits the OCC to extend the holding
period of real estate for another five years (based on annual justifi-
cations).10 Under the Board Standard for Regulation K "dpc" ac-
quisitions, the holding period is two years. 7 In contrast, Section
211.5(f) investments under Regulation K provide for a fifteen year
time period within which the bank must dispose of its swap
investments.1 8
Because many debt-equity regimes prohibit a swap investment
from being repatriated from the country for periods of time rang-
ing from three to twelve years, care must be taken to structure the
transaction in order to comply with both banking restrictions and
foreign law. In the two OCC rulings, the bank in question estab-
lished a system of multi-level subsidiaries in which shares could be
sold to other subsidiaries without the need to repatriate the invest-
ment from the country by simply substituting the owner of the in-
vestment. In addition, "put and call" agreements were negotiated
with important financial groups, providing the bank with the op-
tion of requiring such groups to purchase the bank's interest in the
swap investment within a short time frame.
D. Approval of "DPC" Acquisitions
Because a bank carries out a "dpc" acquisition pursuant to its
inherent powers, there is really no requirement that the OCC (and
presumably any other primary regulator) review or pass upon the
proposed transaction. Nevertheless, a prudent national bank that
15. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
16. Id.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(e) (1989).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1989).
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believes it may be departing, even slightly, from prior cases and
rulings may request a no-objection letter from the OCC concerning
the transaction. These no-objection letters serve as informal rul-
ings from the OCC. The process essentially requires describing the
transaction in detail and then discussing at length with OCC repre-
sentatives any issues raised regarding the transaction. Although re-
quests for no-objection letters are normally sent to the OCC re-
gional office, the OCC's Washington, D.C. office usually decides
transactions involving foreign debt-equity swaps.
If a bank expends any funds in addition to a mere swap of the
debt in the course of a "dpc" investment, however, the OCC may
require prior notification and, once it has notice, may object to the
transaction or require it be restructured. 9
E. "DPC" Acquisition Versus Regulation K Investment
There are various advantages and disadvantages in choosing a
"dpc" format for a swap investment over that permitted by a Reg-
ulation K format. First, Regulation K permits few foreign invest-
ments for U.S. banks (as opposed to bank holding companies or
other banking entities). Additionally, there are significant interaf-
filiate transaction problems in arranging the transfer of foreign
debt from the bank holding the debt to the investor. Regulation K
also establishes certain prudential limitations in terms of the
amount that can be invested without a thorough review by the
Board,2" whereas a "dpc" acquisition can be made irrespective of
the relationship between the amount of the investment and the
capital and surplus of the bank.2 Regulation K also establishes nu-
merous other limitations which must be observed.2 2 Under a "dpc"
acquisition, in contrast, the only critical issue is whether the bank-
ing investor is speculating or genuinely attempting to effect a max-
imum salvage of a troubled debt. As a result, OCC no-objection
letters in this area, therefore, tend to be very fact-specific. Under
Regulation K, however, there is no general requirement of divesti-
ture of an investment and, where there are some time limits for
divestiture, these limits extend further than those applicable to
"dpc" acquisitions.
19. See OCC Examining Bulletin 80-14 (Aug. 20, 1980).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c) (1989).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
22. See supra note 1.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As of the date of this article, the mechanisms set out above
constituted the principal options for U.S. banking organizations
that are contemplating making an investment in a foreign country
through a debt-equity swap. Somewhere in the maze of federal
banking regulation (and presumably under state regulation as
well), a bank can probably find an acceptable route for conducting
a desired transaction. As evidenced by the recent OCC letters and
the Board's recent expansion of the options available under Regu-
lation K, banking regulators in this country are aware that U.S.
banks face very difficult choices regarding the foreign debts they
hold. These regulators are willing to grant banks considerable flexi-
bility in order to confront these problems and overcome them.
From all of the recent developments, however, it appears that the
law in this area is not completely settled. Indeed, new approaches
and initiatives are likely to be developed in the future.
